Russia Struggling to Compete in Rare Earths

Executive Summary:

Russia is attempting to enter a rare earth elements (REEs) and critical minerals competition that is already taking shape without it by engaging in state‑driven projects. It is signaling to compensate for restrictions in its own processing capacity, capital, and market access.

People’s Republic of China and U.S. partnerships across rare earth and critical mineral supply chain development are a major loss for Russia, which is losing the ability to retain influence in countries thought to be in its economic orbit.

Russia is pursuing REE initiatives that stretch beyond its industrial base and capabilities, including plans to develop a major manganese deposit in Ukraine’s occupied Zaporizhzhia oblast.

On May 20–22 this year, Russia plans to host the International Congress on Rare Metals, Materials and Technologies (REDMET‑2026) in Moscow (Rosatom Science, April 7). The congress is part of a broader Kremlin effort to position itself as a rare earth elements (REE) supply chain partner, even as it remains dependent on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and lags behind U.S.‑backed firms that are already consolidating REE assets and integrated supply chains abroad.

REDMET-2026  signals an attempt to counter Russia’s peripheral position in the global push for REE supply chain security. It will convene 500 participants from 15 countries, including India and the PRC along with countries from the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (Rosatom Science, April 7). The head of the organizing committee claims that countries such as India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Laos, and unnamed African countries have expressed interest in applying Russian technologies and scientific expertise to their rare-earth mining, processing, and refining needs (Rosatom Science, April 7). One senior REDMET-2026 official framed the congress as a platform to promote Russian technologies and scientific expertise and signal foreign interest in cooperation on rare-earth projects outside Russia (RIA Novosti, December 26, 2025; Rosatom, April 7). Russia, meanwhile, imports 90 percent of its REE supply from abroad, most of which is assumed to come from the PRC (official data on import origins is not publicly available) (Nezavisimaia Gazeta, July 29, 2024; see EDM, February 13).

Moscow is accelerating state-driven projects, including the Lovozersky mining and processing plant, the Mendeleev Valley REE processing cluster in Siberia, and Rosatom’s mine-to-magnet supply chain development (Atomic Energy, June 11, 2025; see EDM, February 13). It has also begun steps to develop a manganese deposit in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia oblast, which Russia illegally occupies (Kommersant, April 17). The deposit is one of the largest in the world and reportedly capable of producing up to 1.7 million tons of manganese per year (Kommersant, April 17). At present, Russia imports 90 percent of its manganese needs (The Moscow Times, April 17). While it is not a REE, it is considered a critical mineral. Manganese is a key material for defense purposes as it is essential to iron and steel production (NATO, December 11, 2024; U.S. Defense Logistics Agency, accessed April 23). Developing the Ukrainian deposit, however, is problematic for Russia. Zaporizhzhia oblast is a conflict zone and legally is the sovereign territory of Ukraine. Russia also has very limited domestic capacity to process and refine manganese and, in practice, has historically depended on sending manganese ore abroad for processing or importing processed material (Dashevskii, V Ya. et al, “Manganese Problem in Russian Metallurgy,” January 27, 2021). Russia would still likely need to export the ore for processing and refining as its domestic steel production industry already struggles with demand and profitability (The Moscow Times, June 19, July 1, 2025; 1.ru, March 31).

These initiatives are getting Russia nowhere near meaningful international competition. In October 2025, Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation, Rosatom, was in discussions with Brazil about REEs and uranium deposits and described mineral extraction as “the top of our work with Brazil” (TASS, October 23, 2025). A major loss for Russia in these attempted discussions is a U.S. company’s purchase of Brazil’s Pela Ema mining operation. USA Rare Earth announced on April 20 that it had agreed to acquire Brazilian company Serra Verde Group, which operates the Pela Ema rare earth mine and processing plant in Goiás (USA Rare Earth, April 20). Pela Ema is the first deposit outside Asia to produce at scale all four critical rare earths used in permanent magnet production (Mining Technology, January 12, 2024). Serra Verde originally agreed to 10-year deals with PRC companies to purchase its concentrate, but the company decided to prematurely terminate the contracts by the end of 2026 in a move to open its market to Western companies (World Energy News, December 4, 2025; Minera Brasil, December 8, 2025).

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has prioritized Brazil as its key partner in Latin America (see EDM, March 11). On March 25, Rosatom subsidiary Uranium One Group and Brazil’s Núcleo Brasil Energia Participações (NBEPar) announced a joint venture, Nadina Minerals, to implement mining projects in Brazil (Rosatom, March 25). The agreement expands Rosatom’s cooperation with Brazil in nuclear energy by supplying enriched uranium to the country’s Angra nuclear power plant (NPP) (see EDM, March 11; Interfax, March 24). Official announcements about the new agreement do not clarify exactly what this expansion entails beyond geological exploration and the development of extraction and processing projects for “critical and strategic minerals” (Núcleo Brasil, March 25). Official reports suggest that uranium is central, if not the only, natural resource in the agreement, rather than other critical minerals or REEs (Núcleo Brasil; Rosatom, March 25).

Russia also faces mounting competition in Central Asia, where the United States and the PRC continue to consolidate their own positions across critical minerals projects. Beijing has formalized major agreements with Kazakhstan covering copper smelting, tungsten manufacturing, and the creation of an integrated non‑ferrous metals production complex (see EDM, April 3, 2025; see China Brief, October 17, 2025). These arrangements tie extraction to processing capacity and deepen the PRC’s industrial presence in a region that Moscow considers within its sphere of influence (see EDM, April 13). This forces Moscow to balance cooperation with Beijing against the risk of losing influence over resource development and industrial planning (see EDM, February 13).

The United States has expanded its own engagement in Central Asia’s critical minerals sector by supporting investment frameworks and partnerships with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (U.S. Embassy & Consulate in Kazakhstan, February 11; U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, February 18; UZ Daily, February 19; Government of Kazakhstan, March 12). For Kazakhstan, cooperation with the United States supports its effort to retain control over resource development while attracting external capital that does not require political alignment or security concessions (Government of Kazakhstan, November 7, 2025, March 12; Dprom.kz, February 6). For Uzbekistan, cooperation with the United States is part of a broader push to modernize its mining sector and attract partners capable of supporting exploration, processing, and regulatory reform (TMK, November 24, 2025; President of Uzbekistan, September 22, 2025; Anadolu Ajansı, February 19).

REDMET‑2026 falls short in its design to counter Russia’s marginal status in the surge of global REE cooperation. In Moscow’s attempt to come to terms with its rejection by the PRC as an equal partner and with growing competition from the United States, it is instead finding itself desperate and constrained by its own industrial shortcomings. As things stand, Moscow faces a narrowing set of choices about how long it can sustain the appearance of relevance while remaining a late and weak entrant in a contest already shaped by others, over whom it holds little influence. "Surce: Jamestown.org"